In this interview Nancy Fraser elucidates important conceptual topics of her theory, she also shares her analysis of the global financial crisis and how it has changed the setting for theorists of justice. Her account reminds us of critical theory's important role in helping us think -and act -differently in difficult times.
dimensional theory of justice that aimed at encompassing the economic demands of redistribution as well as the cultural demands of recognition, you added a third (political) dimension to your framework by establishing representation as an equally important dimension of justice. In hindsight and considering that urgent global problems such as the financial crisis, global warming, global health crisis, among others, seem more pressing than ever, do you still think that "globalization is changing the way we argue about justice" or has it already changed? Have the injustices of misrepresentation been more adequately explored in the grammar of justice? Could you please share your thoughts on the changes you've seen on this matter.
NF:
That's a great question! I think that the picture would be mixed, actually. I definitely think that there is more awareness of the need for a global perspective, the need to break out from an exclusively Westphalian framing of justice questions. I think people understand that issues like climate change or financial predation have a global dimension and that they can't be addressed exclusively at the national territorial state level. I also think that we've had important social movements -including the movement of movements, the World Social Forum -that have promoted this broader way of thinking. However, I think what has changed since then is the sort of overuse of brute power by the global financial interest so that people are, I think, perhaps scared.
Take the European Union and the Greek situation, this was a case in which because of the European Union integration, a sort of integration of markets but without full fiscal integration -a real full political integration -you get a situation where a country like Greece is deprived of the old historic power of the state to control it's currency and to run deficit financing and to ethic@ -Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, v.15, n.1, p.1-13, Jul. 2016. maintain level of social services through borrowing. They no longer have the capacity to do that, they're very much under the thumb of the European Central Bank and the creditors. At the same time there is this whole new regime of the bond markets, and everyone saying that the "Greek bonds is like junk bonds and we're not going to let them borrow anymore money" and so forth.
So here you get a problem of scale, a problem of levels. You've got a government at a national level, you got a regional political community, as they call it, you've got transnational investors and corporate powers, you've got central banks that are accountable to no one and you've got global financial markets. Everything is out of line so that the scale, the level, where you generate political communicative -political power -remains the nation-state, that's where the Greek electorate mobilizes and so on. But because of this problem of scale, they don't have the capacity to solve their own problems through their own state. Now, I think we've all seen that the financial markets and the central bankers were determined to make an example of Greece, to show the rest of Europe and the world that even if you elect an antiausterity government, you are not going to put that policy into practice. So this is just like a lesson in these problems of scale and misframing of the justice question through a mismatch of scale.
I think we all see this and the other side of this is a sort of inadequacy of solidarity, we don't have broad enough solidarity to mobilize people to oppose this kind of misframing. The Greeks were basically left alone to hang out to dry. The other European, even the social movements and the Left parties in Europe, did not really support them. So I believe the analysis in Scales of Justice about the problem of scale -about mismatches of scale, about, therefore, misrepresentation and the misframing of questions of justice in the wrong scaleremains relevant and I think that the things I've been talking about are a good illustration.
JSM:
Still tracing the developments in your framework, whereas the two-dimensional account was defined in terms of "adding insult to injury", you have affirmed that slogan "no redistribution or recognition without representation" seems to adequately capture the injustice of misframing. This injustice requires a normative principle for evaluating frames.
Considering the principles that could fulfill this role you now consider the all-subjected principle as the standard. This also marked a change in your recent work, as you initially appealed to the all-affected principle 9 . You have argued that this principle has advantages better alternative because what that says is that everybody who is subject to the rule-making and rule-enforcing power of a govern structure is in a sense a subject of that structure, even though we are not in these structures necessarily citizens with official participation rights.
Nevertheless, we're subject to their power, to their capacity to make and enforce binding rules, and that seems to me be a strong kind of affectedness that is meaningful and it's a political relationship.
When you are affected by coercively enforceable rules and you are subjected to them, you stand in a political relationship to the rule-making bodies and you stand in a relationship of co-subjection to fellow participants, who are also in that relation to the rule-making authority.
That really is a political relation. It seems to me that it is the right sort of answer, the right sort of principle that one who wants to think about "who counts". In other words, the fact that citizens of very poor and weak states -and some cases even failed states -are also subject to the rule-making authority of, say, the IMF, however indirectly, that matters. That gives them standing to claim, the right to have a say in these matters, just as we think citizens have the right to say in their governments. So there's a sort of rhetoric in modern history that talks from subject to citizen, from being the object of the law you must obey to being the author of the law with others -participating in making, approving and debating and so on. That's what I wanted to capture: that so much of governance today is occurring at the hands of these nebulous and unaccountable bodies, whether we're talking about the TRIPs, the Intellectual Property Regime, bodies like the NAFTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the IMF and so on -these institutions have enormous power over our living conditions and we should be citizens, we are now merely subjects. So my idea was by proposing an all subjected principle, everyone who was subjected to a given regulatory framework (governance framework) should have participation in rights in a political sense. I think that's a promising answer to the "who counts" or "who should count". 12 has popularized, the expression "leaning in" -it means playing tough, just like men. You don't sit back and make nice, but go after and negotiate hard in the corporate boardroom to get a raise or your promotion. Now, one thing that is very clear about this is that in order for this thin stratum of very educated, privileged women to benefit from this kind of feminism, something else has to happen: they have to be able to offload their care work -their domestic labor, their childcare, their eldercare -all to somebody else. Who is that somebody else? It is typically racialized or immigrant women, poor women, often from rural regions who are coming to try to get a better life an who are taking up these service jobs, sometimes domestic work in private households, nannies, maids, and so on. Sometimes they go to work in childcare centers or in nursing homes, in institutional setting, but in either case they're very low paid, they're very precarious feminism for all women.
The only kind of feminism that could be a feminism for all women would have to be one that took a hard critical look at the whole way that our society is structured around the division between paid productive work and unpaid reproductive work and that is a gendered division.
Thus, we'd have to have a feminism movement that was focused on that and on trying to transform it, reimagine it, and reinvent the whole relationship between paid work and personal 
In Transnationalizing the Public Sphere you confront the challenge of how to conceptualize the public sphere in a post-Westphalian world. By arguing that political citizenship can no longer demarcate "who" is the public, the condition of legitimacy of public opinion as centered in citizens loses its meaning. As was discussed above, the all-subjected principle is a path that you consider more promising to fill that role. I want to ask about the second condition of a critical conception of publicity, that is, political efficacy. Both elements of political efficacy, that is, the translation condition and the capacity condition relate to power structures (binding laws, administrative power and capacity to realize the public's design). Has your thinking evolved concerning public capacity and its obstacles in a transnational world. Could you share your reflections regarding this issue?
NF: I think in a nutshell we could say that today the capacities of corporate capital have far outstripped the capacities of public political agencies. The capacities of private economic power are much greater then the capacities of public political powers. So we really do need, in my view, to build up, strengthen, public political capacities so that they are able to actually reign in and control the private corporate powers. It's the same issue that we spoke about a little while ago, about the power of the bond markets, the investors: they fly around the world picking one country after another and just trying to destroy their capacity to govern. So, and I believe that this remains a very pressing and important issue. Now, the translation side is also significant. This is a case where you generate public opinion and then you have to be able to translate it into administrative power. Somebody has to implement the opinion. You have to get it to the power-holders, again, presumably democratically elected, accountable, power-holders. Here, the questions have to do with the role of monopoly, corporate media outlets, the commercialization of the public sphere, the difficulty of getting out voices of subaltern perspectives -all of that means that even when you have a certain public opinion, it can become impotent, it's not efficacious, it can't actually constrain. The whole point -and this is really Habermas's key point -of this concept of the public sphere, you're talking about a kind of counterpower, a communicative power that can actually confront institutional power. A power that says: "no, you don't have the right to do that. You have to do something else." For this power to mean something it has got to be able to constrain the institutional powers. And there are many issues as to how translation, from the informal civil society spaces of opinion-making to the official decision-taking bodies, whether we're talking about parliaments, whatever, do not proceed correctly, it goes awry. So I haven't changed my mind, I believe that both the capacity idea and the translation idea remain crucial for a critical theory of a public sphere and I think each of them names a ethic@ -Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, v.15, n.1, p.1-13, Jul. 2016.
real problem.
They are linked and one important issue is how to relate these capacities to some of the obstacles that cosmopolitan theory has to encounter. I'm thinking here of the differences between moral and political cosmopolitanism and the difficulties that the latter faces in terms of implementation.
NF: Look, I am very impatient with the new vogue of anarchism among the young people. I believe that you don't have democracy without a coercive power. It has to be a public power, a democratically accountable, popularly organized and elected power. It can be to some degree decentralized for some questions, but there is no substitute for this. You're fooling yourself if you think you can get rid of injustice without a coercive power and certainly not in a situation like the present where you have, you know, ExxonMobil, Union Carbide, all of these criminal dispoliers of the environment for example. So I think moral cosmopolitanism is quite insufficient, I think anarchism is quite insufficient and even a certain kind of legal human rights cosmopolitanism is quite insufficient. I think we've been too intimated by a certain rhetorical talk taken from Kant that a "world state can only be a soulless despotism".
Well, I don't want one world state for everything, but I think for issues like climate change they can only be addressed at the world issue, the global level, and for there we do need world level, public powers with the ability to coerce, compel obedience.
You have described the present context as one of "abnormal justice": a time in which the "grammar of justice is up for grabs", as questions surface not only regarding substantive claims of justice, but also in regards to the conceptual space within which they arise and who is entitled to such claims. In this setting, you argue for a conception of "reflexive justice". It is interesting to note that in your point of view the best scenario for our times wouldn't be one of "renormalization". The cultivation of abnormality per se is also eschewed as your signal to the idea of "reflexive justice" as the best suited for the present. This idea articulates the "opening" to contestation as well as the "closure", which enables political decisions. or less something normal in this sense.
With the cracking of that whole world and the development of this new world, in which boundaries are routinely crossed without the bat of an eye by corporations, by militaries, by carbon emissions, by disease, by arms trafficking, you name it, everything is up for grabs. So we now have arguments over justice in which people do not share the same presuppositions.
Some are assuming a global frame, others are sticking to the old national frame, some are assuming something in between, some are talking about distribution, others are talking about recognition and so on. This is, so far, just a description of the present.
The question that I wanted to pose having described things in this language was: "What should we be looking for to resolve this question?" And I started out by thinking that this situation of abnormality has a good side and a bad side. The good side is that it is more open, so that people who in the past were really just thrown into the margins because there was a consensus that they didn't share, these people, now have a greater ability to challenge and to get their claims out, to articulate a different language, a different frame, that's the good side: it allows us to contest invisible injustices, injustices that were swept under the rug in the previous normality. The bad side, though, is that because there is so much openness it becomes very hard to imagine how you can actually reach an agreement, take a decision, implement policies and so forth. It's too open. The practice of justice has both moments:
critique and then reconstruction. For critique is the practice of opening and reconstruction is a kind of a closure. Abnormal justice has the opening but not the closure; normal justice has the closure but not the opening, so these are mirror images. The idea of reflective justice was supposed to be a grasping for some way of having both: having both opening and closure. I don't know exactly how to translate it -this is an intuition -into a concrete example. At one point I had the idea -and this is just a thought experiment, it is not a real proposal -of something like "framing courts" where you could come and say: "this way of framing the question is wrong" and then you could have a venue where people from different sites could argue about whether it was right or whether it was wrong and then reach a decision, that's the kind of idea of what reflective justice is. What it means is a place where you could call into question first-order assumptions and find some way of solving the dispute about them.
Notwithstanding the problematic scenario that was outlined and also taking into account your writing, in which you frequently consider the positive and negative aspects of reason why we can't fix things. Will we do it? Remains to be seen.
